Develops a logical analysis of dialogue in which two or more parties attempt to advance their own interests. It includes a classification of the major types of dialogues and a discussion of several important informal fallacies.

This paper attempts to systematically characterize critical reactions in argumentative discourse, such as objections, critical questions, rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges, in order to contribute to the dialogical approach to argumentation. We shall make use of four parameters to characterize distinct types of critical reaction. First, a critical reaction has a focus, for example on the standpoint, or on another part of an argument. Second, critical reactions appeal to some kind of norm, argumentative or other. Third, they each have (...) a particular illocutionary force, which may include that of giving strategic advice to the other. Fourth, a critical reaction occurs at a particular level of dialogue (the ground level or some meta-level). The concepts here developed shall be applied to discussions of critical reactions by Aristotle and by some contemporary authors. (shrink)

In many contexts a retraction of commitment isfrowned upon. For instance, it is not appreciated,generally, if one withdraws a promise or denies anearlier statement. Critical discussion, too, caneasily be disrupted by retractions, if these occur toofrequently and at critical points. But on the otherhand, the very goal of critical discussion –resolution of a dispute – involves a retraction,either of doubt, or of some expressed point of view.A person who never retracts, not even under pressureof cogent arguments, would hardly qualify as (...) areasonable discussant. Also, inconsistencies in one'sposition, once they have been pointed out, must bedealt with by some kind of retraction. The problem ofretraction is to find a suitable model of dialoguethat allows retractions where they seem reasonable, oreven required, and rules them out (or puts sanctionsupon them) whenever they would become disruptive of awell-organized process of dialogue.The present paper tries to point to a solution basedon the following principles: (1) Retraction rulesdetermine what retractions are permissible, and (2) ifpermissible what the consequences of retraction are.(3) Retraction rules vary according to the type ofdialogue and (4) according to the type of commitmentretracted. For instance, assertions and mereconcessions need to be distinguished, as well aslight-side and dark-side commitments. (5) To accountfor our contradictory intuitions on the issue ofretractions, one may best resort to a complex type ofdialogue in which different retraction rules hold fordifferent parts.The paper explains, summarizes, and expands upon thediscussion of retraction in Commitment inDialogue by Douglas Walton and the present author(cf. Walton and Krabbe 1995). (shrink)

Section 1 contains a survey of options in constructing a formal system of dialogue rules. The distinction between material and formal systems is discussed (section 1.1). It is stressed that the material systems are, in several senses, formal as well. In section 1.2 variants as to language form (choices of logical constants and logical rules) are pointed out. Section 1.3 is concerned with options as to initial positions and the permissibility of attacks on elementary statements. The problem of ending a (...) dialogue, and of infinite dialogues, is treated in section 1.4. Other options, e.g., as to the number of attacks allowed with respect to each statement, are listed in section 1.5. Section 1.6 explains the concept of a chain of arguments.From section 2 onward four types of dialectic systems are picked out for closer study: D, E, Di and Ei. After a preliminary section on dialogue sequents and winning strategies, the equivalence of derivability in intuitionistic logic and the existence of a winning strategy (for the Proponent) on the strength of Ei is shown by simple inductive proofs. (shrink)

We shall investigate the similarities and dissimilarities between old and new dialectic. For the ‘old dialectic’, we base our survey mainly on Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations, whereas for the ‘new dialectic’, we turn to contemporary views on dialogical interaction, such as can, for the greater part, be found in Walton’s The New Dialectic. Three issues are taken up: types of dialogue, fallacies, and strategies. Though one should not belittle the differences in scope and outlook that obtain between the old (...) and the new dialectic, the paper will show that in many respects the old dialectic foreshadows the new dialectic. (shrink)

OVERVIEWWe ambitiously reexamine Smith’s moral theory in relation to Hume’s. We regard Smith's developments as glorious and important. We also see them as quite fully agreeable to Hume, as enhancement, not departure. But Smith represents matters otherwise! Why would Smith overstate disagreement with his best friend?One aspect of Smith’s enhancement, an aspect he makes very conspicuous, is that between moral approval and beneficialness there is another phase, namely, the moral judge's sense of propriety. With that phase now finding formulation, Smith, (...) if only implicitly, generates a spiral of beneficialness and propriety, a spiral shown in Figure 7 in the present paper. We consider Figure 7, illustrating the spiral, to be the most important arrival point in the present paper; it highlights the non-foundationalism of Smith's ethics. But to arrive at the spiral, we must engage in extensive exegesis.In Part IV of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith presents a foil against which he develops his own theory, a foil supposedly representing Hume. According to the foil, moral approval derives from ‘utility.’ But, in multiple ways, the foil is misleading. We provide an interpretation of Hume, notably his four-factor account of moral approval, before examining Smith's representation of Hume.One twist is that Smith used the words utility and useful differently than Hume did – Smith quietly stretched them to include species of agreeableness, thereby obscuring the importance of agreeableness in Hume’s theory.Another, more significant problem is that Smith allows the impression that in Hume moral approval derives quite determinately from beneficialness. In fact Hume conveys the interpretive and sentimental spaciousness of the operations that generate moral approval; here, Hume even speaks repeatedly of ‘proper sentiments’, thus almost using the term propriety himself.But the propriety phase in Smith opens up to a key facet of Smith’s development on Hume: He poeticizes a locus of sympathy not emphasized in Hume – namely, that between the moral judge and her own man within the breast; that locus enters the theory in addition to the sympathies emphasized in Hume, not in lieu of them. We distinguish lateral sympathy, which is important in Hume’s thought, and vertical sympathy, which is especially characteristic of Smith’s more inner-directed and allegorical thought. Smith embraces Hume’s lateral sympathy and enhances moral theory by adding formulations that elaborate vertical sympathy.Next, we come to something of a twist in the whole matter: We show that – as Smith well knew all along! – propriety is a species of agreeableness! Smith’s propriety phase represents another dimension within which such agreeableness lives: Smith’s vertical dimension thus gives rise to a spiral representing the diachronic development of the judge herself. It is a spiral of beneficialness and propriety: Each propriety phase in the next loop of the spiral engenders a species of agreeableness now as a part of beneficialness.Smith's developments on Hume, then, involve the following three facets: formulation of the propriety phase; the poetic elaboration of vertical sympathy; the diachronic spiral of propriety and beneficialness.The three facets come together, especially in Ed. 6 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The whole development goes beyond Hume, but, really, is agreeable to Hume – though Smith himself portrays his developments as disagreeing with features of Hume's moral theory.We speculate that Smith was more or less aware of all that that we say, including the absense of any really substantive disagreement. Why, in that case, would Smith have proceeded as he did? We address that question at the end of the piece. Our speculations suggest a method in the madness. (shrink)

Any well-structured argumentative exchange must be preceded by some preparatory stages. In the pragma-dialectical four-stage model of critical discussion, the clarification of issues and positions is relegated to the confrontation stage and the other preparatory matters are dealt within the opening stage. In the opening stage, the parties involved come to agree to discuss their differences and to do so by an argumentative exchange rather than by, say, a sequence of bids and offers. They should also come to agree on (...) the rules of dialogue, on roles, on logical principles, on types of argument, and on the propositions that can be used as basic premises. All in all, a lot of work needs to be done before the first topical argument can be put forward. Especially the opening stage seems prone to further disagreements and protracted discussions, e.g., about the admissibility of particular kinds of argument or particular basic premises. There is also the problem that a successful opening stage threatens to settle matters beforehand and thus put the argumentation stage out of business. The paper suggests some measures that could alleviate the workload of the opening stage, without making the argumentation stage otiose. (shrink)

This paper discusses several types of relevance criticism within dialogue. Relevance criticism is a way one could or should criticize one's partner's contribution in a conversation as being deficient in respect of conversational coherence. The first section tries to narrow down the scope of the subject to manageable proportions. Attention is given to the distinction between criticism of alleged fallacies within dialogue and such criticism as pertains to argumentative texts. Within dialogue one may distigguish tenability criticism, connection criticism, and narrow-type (...) relevance criticism. Only the last of these three types of criticism constitutes a charge of fallacy and carries with it a burden of proof. In the second it is observed that a full study of narrow-type relevance criticism would require the construction of complicated, many-layered, dialogue systems. Such a study can, however, be profitably preceded by setting up profiles of dialogue that help us discuss the ins and outs of certain types of move. This is illustrated with an example. (shrink)

Formal dialectic has its roots in ancient dialectic. We can trace this influence in Charles Hamblin’s book on fallacies, in which he introduced his first formal dialectical systems. Earlier, Paul Lorenzen proposed systems of dialogical logic, which were in fact formal dialectical systems avant la lettre, with roles similar to those of the Greek Questioner and Answerer. In order to make a comparison between ancient dialectic and contemporary formal dialectic, I shall formalize part of the Aristotelian procedure for Academic debates. (...) The resulting system will be compared (1) with Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s system of rules of Critical Discussion (the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure), which must, however, first itself be reconstructed as a formal dialectical system, and (2) with a Hamblin-type system, and (3) a Lorenzen-type system. When drawing comparisons, it will become clear that there is a line to be drawn from Aristotle to formal dialectic and pragma-dialectics, extending to contemporary computational models of argument. (shrink)

Drawing on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in Cambodia, Erik W. Davis radically recasts attitudes toward the nature of Southeast Asian Buddhism's interactions with local religious practice and, by extension, reorients our understanding of Buddhism itself. Through a vivid study of contemporary Cambodian Buddhist funeral rites, he reveals the powerfully integrative role monks play as they care for the dead and negotiate the interplay of non-Buddhist spirits and formal Buddhist customs. Buddhist monks perform funeral rituals rooted in the embodied practices of (...) Khmer rice farmers and the social hierarchies of Khmer culture. The monks' realization of death underwrites key components of the Cambodian social imagination: the distinction between wild death and celibate life, the forest and the field, and moral and immoral forms of power. By connecting the performative aspects of Buddhist death rituals to Cambodian history and everyday life, Davis undermines the theory that elite Buddhist monks universally oppose rural belief systems. Instead, he shows Cambodian Buddhism to be a robust tradition with ethical and popular components extending throughout Khmer society. (shrink)

Criticism may degenerate into quibbling or nitpicking. How can discussants keep quibblers under control? In the paper we investigate cases in which a battle about words replaces a discussion of the matters that are actually at issue as well as cases in which a battle about minor objections replaces a discussion of the major issues. We survey some lines of discussion dealing with these situations in profiles of dialogue.

This paper explores applications of concepts from argumentation theory to mathematical proofs. Note is taken of the various contexts in which proofs occur and of the various objectives they may serve. Examples of strategic maneuvering are discussed when surveying, in proofs, the four stages of argumentation distinguished by pragma-dialectics. Derailments of strategies (fallacies) are seen to encompass more than logical fallacies and to occur both in alleged proofs that are completely out of bounds and in alleged proofs that are at (...) least mathematical arguments. These considerations lead to a dialectical and rhetorical view of proofs. (shrink)

What if in discussion the critic refuses to recognize an emotionally expressed argument of her interlocutor as an argument, accusing him of having presented no argument at all. In this paper, we shall deal with this reproach, which taken literally amounts to a charge of having committed a fallacy of non-argumentation. As such it is a very strong, if not the ultimate, criticism, which even carries the risk of abandonment of the discussion and can, therefore, not be made without burdening (...) oneself with correspondingly strong obligations. We want to specify the fallacies of non-argumentation and their dialectic, i.e., the proper way to criticize them, the appropriate ways for the arguer to react to such criticism, and the appropriate ways for the critic to follow up on these reactions. Among the types of fallacy of non-argumentation, the emphasis will be on the appeal to popular sentiments. Our aim is to reach, for cases of non-argumentation, a survey of dialectical possibilities. By making the disputants themselves responsible for the place of emotion in their dialogues, we hope to contribute to a further development of the theory of dialectical obligations. (shrink)

This paper examines some connections between Hume’s epistemology in his Treatise of Human Nature and his political economy. I make three claims: First, I argue that it is the development of Hume’s account of the faculty of reason in Book I of the Treatise that leads him to emphasize social science—including political economy—and the humanities over more abstract modes of intellectual inquiry. Second, I argue that Hume’s conception of reason has implications for his methodology in political economy. His perception of (...) human reason leads him to deploy a method of qualified generalization that emphasizes the by-and-large nature of theoretical statements. Third, when it comes to policy matters, the method of qualified generalization in theory cashes out in terms of practical maxims. I suggest that two central maxims in Hume’s political economy derive from his views of the usefulness of economic liberty and the coordinating nature of the status quo. (shrink)

Argumentative discussion is successful only if, at the concluding stage, both parties can agree about the result of their enterprise. If they can not, the whole discussion threatens to start all over again. Dialectical ruling should prevent this from happening. The paper investigates whether dialectical rules may enforce a decision one way or the other; either by recognizing some arguments as conclusive or some criticisms as devastating. At the end the pragma-dialectical model appears more successful than even its protagonists have (...) claimed. (shrink)

The situationally disqualifying ad hominem attack is an argumentative move in critical dialogue whereby one participant points out certain features in his adversary's personal situation that are claimed to make it inappropriate for this adversary to take a particular point of view, to argue in a particular way, or to launch certain criticisms. In this paper, we discuss some examples of this way of arguing. Other types of ad hominem argumentation are discussed as well and compared with the situationally disqualifying (...) type. The socalled Houtlosser Dilemma highlights the danger of unconditionally condoning ad hominem arguments. We propose a classification of ad hominem, and a more restrictive use of the term 'circumstantial'. Finally, we discuss whether ad hominem arguments are (always?) to be rejected as fallacious. (shrink)

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of (...) the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy. (shrink)

One of Hume's early biographers, John Hill Burton, described Hume's Political Discourses as "the cradle of political economy".1 "As much as that science has been investigated and expounded in later times," Burton argued, "these earliest, shortest, and simplest developments of its principles [in the Political Discourses] are still read with delight even by those who are masters of all the literature of this great subject."2 In their recent book, Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind do much to vindicate Burton's claim, illustrating (...) the genius, breadth, and lasting influence, across various schools of thought, of Hume's economics.Through a careful exposition of Hume's reflections on the methodology of... (shrink)

This essay uses concepts from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop ideas about choice and welfare. I use those ideas to offer several challenges to common approaches to behavioral welfare economics and new paternalist policy making. Drawing on Smith’s dialectical concept of practical reason, which he develops in expositing ideas about self-awareness and self-judgment, I first argue that inconsistency need not be viewed as pathological. Inconsistent choices might indicate legitimate context-dependencies as individuals reflect over disjointed perspectives and (...) act accordingly. Understanding inconsistency as reasonable raises epistemic difficulties for identifying errant choices and designing corrective policies. Second, I draw on Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator to discuss dynamic aspects of welfare. Welfare is not simply a matter of preference satisfaction but involves a sense of progress and improvement towards better preferences. Smith’s account suggests that economists interested in welfare should focus on institutional arrangements that facilitate self-development. (shrink)

This paper makes an independent start with formalizing the rules for the argumentation stage of critical discussions. It does not deal with the well-known code of conduct consisting of ten rules but with the system consisting of fifteen rules on which the code of conduct is based. The rules of this system are scrutinized and problems they raise are discussed. Then a formal dialectical system is defined that reflects most of the contents of these rules. The aim is to elucidate (...) the way the rules work and to show how a formal approach can be useful to achieve this. It is also shown how the present method can be used to study the nature of circular argumentation. While, generally, the formalization follows closely the original rules for the argumentation stage of critical discussions, there will also be proposed some modifications of the original protocol. (shrink)

Inconsistent Commitments and Commitment to Inconsistencies.

Systems of formal dialectics articulate methods of conflict resolution. To this end they provide norms to regulate verbal exchanges between the Proponent of a thesis and an Opponent. These regulated exchanges constitute what are known as formal discussions.One may ask what moves, if any, in formal discusions correspond to arguing for or against the thesis. It is claimed that certain moves of the Proponent's are properly designated as arguing for the thesis, and that certain moves of the Opponent purport to (...) criticize the tenability or the relevance of the reasons advanced. Thus the usefulness of formal dialectic systems as models for reasonable argument is vindicated.It is then proposed to make these systems more realistic by incorporating in them a norm of Creative Reasoning that removes the severe restrictions to which the Proponent's arguing was hitherto subject. As a consequence, a certain type of irrelevant reason is no longer automatically excluded. Therefore, it is proposed to extend the Opponent's rights to exert relevance criticism. The new dialectic systems are shown to be strategically equivalent to the original ones. Finally, it is stressed that the Opponent's criticism should not be designated as arguing against the thesis. The Opponent criticizes, but does not argue. (shrink)

:Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping; and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, anger is (...) often seen as an antisocial motivator resulting in aggression. However, other research has shown that moral outrage, anger evoked by the violation of a moral rule or a social norm, can lead to the punishment of a perpetrator, often described as altruistic or pro-social punishment. Some of the motivations for pro-social punishment, namely a concern for justice or the restoration of community values, can also be realized through victim compensation. We therefore propose the hypothesis that moral outrage leads to compensating behavior above and beyond what is predicted by empathic concern, but only when a social norm has been violated. We test this hypothesis in two studies, both of which use modified trust games in which the investor experiences a loss due either to a social norm violation or some other cause. Study 1 shows that trait moral outrage predicts third-party compensatory behavior above and beyond empathic concern, but only when a social norm is violated. To better understand the causal mechanism, Study 2 directly manipulated moral outrage, showing again that moral outrage leads to compensation, but only when a social norm is violated. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

What roles do “winning” and “losing” have to play in argumentative discussions? We say that someone has “won” a discussion or debate, but also an emphasis on “winning” is often rejected. The question is: can these concepts be so interpreted that justice is done to these antagonistic views? Starting from Aristotelian ideas, the paper purports to establish that the views mentioned above can indeed be reconciled.